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15. EQUITY AND TRUSTS 
TANG Hang Wu 
LLB (National University of Singapore). LLM, PhD (Cambridge);  
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
Express trust 
15.1 The case of Goi Wang Firn (Ni Wanfen) v Chee Kow Ngee Sing 
(Pte) Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1049 raises a very interesting point with regard to 
the “beneficiary principle”. In this case, the late Goi had declared that he 
held certain property on trust for a company. When Goi passed away, 
his executor’s counsel attempted to undermine the trust by arguing, inter 
alia, that the “beneficiary principle” precluded a settlor from declaring 
an express trust for a non-human entity. Steven Chong J rejected this 
argument, holding that (at [27]): 
My understanding of the ‘beneficiary principle’ has always been that it 
is intended, through its insistence on the presence of some identifiable 
beneficiary, to ensure that a trust can both be enforced against the 
trustee and controlled by the courts. The aim of this is to nullify those 
trusts which have as their objects purely private purposes that, by 
virtue of their wholly abstract nature, cannot conceivably be enforced 
or policed … It was therefore not immediately apparent to me where 
the objection lay in recognising that a company could own property 
beneficially under an express trust since it is trite that a company is a 
legal person capable of suing in its own right … and can, accordingly, 
enforce a trust if necessary. [emphasis in original] 
15.2 Guy Neale v Nine Squares Pty Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 1097 
(“Guy Neale”) is a case which considered, inter alia, whether a trade 
mark is held on an express trust for a partnership. In this case, the 
plaintiffs were partners of a well-known restaurant, bar and club in Bali 
called “Ku De Ta”. The defendant, Nine Squares Pty Ltd (“Nine 
Squares”), is the registered owner of two trade marks in Singapore 
bearing the name “Ku De Ta”. Nine Squares was a company 
incorporated in the State of Victoria, Australia, where at all material 
times, a partner in “Ku De Ta” Bali, one Arthur Chondros, owned 50% 
of the shares. The plaintiffs argued that an express trust had been 
created whereby Nine Squares held the trade mark on trust for the 
plaintiffs. In this case, there was no dispute as to the certainty of subject 
matter and objects of the express trust. The primary contention is 
certainty of intention. Overturning the trial judge on the facts, the 
Court of Appeal found that there was sufficient evidence that Nine 
Squares intended to hold the trade marks on an express trust for the 
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plaintiffs. After analysing the cases on certainty of intention to create a 
trust, Menon CJ observed that the focus seemed to be (at [58]): 
… whether it was possible and appropriate to infer an intention to 
create a trust by looking at evidence not only of the alleged settlor’s 
words and conduct, but also of the surrounding circumstances and the 
interpretation of any agreements that might have been entered into. 
15.3 Questions concerning older trust instruments continue to 
surface in the Singapore courts. In Zulaikha Bee bte Mohideen Abdul 
Kadir v Quek Chek Khiang [2014] 4 SLR 532, the High Court had to 
consider a trust declared in 1971 by the late Fatimah over certain 
properties in Joo Chiat for the benefit of her daughter, Zulaikha. 
Zulaikha sought to enforce the trust and this was resisted by Fatimah’s 
estate and other children on several grounds. First, it was argued that 
the trust was invalid because it was not registered pursuant to the 
Registration of Deeds Act (Cap 269, 1989 Rev Ed) (“RODA”). Second, it 
was contended that the trust was not validly declared because Fatimah 
did not understand the contents of the trust deed, which was drafted in 
English. Finally, the enforcement of the trust was said to be precluded by 
the doctrine of laches. All these defences were rejected and the trust was 
upheld. With regard to the RODA point, Tan Siong Thye JC (as he then 
was) rightly pointed out that the relevant applicable statute is now the 
Land Titles Act (Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed). Non-registration of the trust 
deed under RODA does not make it inadmissible as evidence or affect 
its validity. The learned judge also found as a matter of fact that the trust 
deed was interpreted to Fatimah. Hence, the allegation that Fatimah did 
not understand the contents of the trust deed was rejected. With regard 
to the doctrine of laches, Tan JC observed rightly that it would be 
extremely rare for the doctrine of laches to apply to an express trust. In 
any case, the defendants were not prejudiced by the time lapse as the key 
witnesses were still available. 
Resulting trusts 
15.4 The decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in Chan Yuen 
Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] 3 SLR 1048 (“Chan Yuen Lan”) (noted in 
Hang Wu Tang, “A Dispute in Chancery Lane: Re-considering the 
Resulting and Common Intention Constructive Trust” (2015) Conv 
(forthcoming) and Rachel Leow & Timothy Liau, “Resulting Trusts: 
A Victory for Unjust Enrichment” (2014) 73(3) Camb LJ 500) is the 
most significant case of the year in equity and trusts. At the heart of the 
dispute was a disagreement about the arrangement that existed between 
See Fong Mun (“See”) and Chan Yuen Lan (“Chan”) in relation to the 
house. See alleged that he was the true owner; Chan’s money was merely 
an interest-free loan to him. The house was registered in her name 
merely so that Chan could boast to her friends. In contrast, Chan said 
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that she owned the house absolutely. She needed the financial security of 
owning a house because See was having an affair with his secretary. 
Chan alleged that See agreed to this arrangement to appease her over 
the affair. Whatever the true arrangement was between the parties, it 
was undisputed that Chan executed a power of attorney in respect of the 
house. The power of attorney authorised See and one of their sons to 
“take charge of, manage and improve [her] property” and, in particular, 
sell the house for such consideration as they saw fit and give receipts for 
the money received: at [17]. An uneasy truce apparently prevailed 
between Chan and See for many years. On 5 April 2011, Chan revoked 
the power of attorney. This prompted See to seek a declaration from the 
courts that the house belonged to him beneficially. 
15.5 Chan Yuen Lan provided the Singapore court with the 
opportunity to reconsider the true jurisprudential basis of the doctrine 
of resulting trust. V K Rajah JA, who delivered the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal, considered head on the following question: “What 
does the resulting trust respond to?” In answering this question, 
Rajah JA endorsed Robert Chambers’ (see Robert Chambers, Resulting 
Trusts (Clarendon Press, 1997)) lack of intention thesis on the resulting 
trust, saying (at [43]): 
… a resulting trust may arise independently of the presumption of 
resulting trust so long as it can be shown that the transfer was not 
intended to benefit the recipient, and conversely, a resulting trust may 
not arise if it can be shown that the transfer was indeed intended to 
benefit the recipient. The intention of the recipient is therefore 
irrelevant to the question of whether a resulting trust has arisen. 
[emphasis in original] 
15.6 The learned judge observed (at [44]) that much ink has been 
spilt on the preferred doctrinal basis of the resulting trust; however, 
going forward, in Singapore “the lack-of-intention analysis may 
potentially provide a more sensible basis for the principled yet 
pragmatic development of this equitable doctrine”. 
15.7 The acceptance of Chambers’ lack of intention thesis is unlikely 
to have significant practical ramifications. This is because Rajah JA was 
careful to say that (at [48]): 
… the courts should tread carefully in this area of the law because an 
unduly wide doctrine of resulting trusts and potential blurring of the 
distinction between claims based on unjust enrichment and claims 
based on resulting trusts might have unsettling effects on the rights of 
third parties and the security of commercial transactions. 
15.8 In this regard, Rajah JA agreed with Graham Virgo (Graham 
Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 
2006) at p 598) that the inquiry as to when a plaintiff ’s intention to 
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benefit the defendant was vitiated for the purposes of identifying an 
unjust factor should not be conflated with the absence of intent analysis 
for the purposes of identifying a resulting trust. The latter should be 
defined more restrictively as compared to the former. 
15.9 Another significant aspect of Chan Yuen Lan is the observation 
that payments towards a mortgage loan may be taken into account in 
quantifying a party’s share of the beneficial interest in the property. 
Under orthodox law, only direct contributions to the purchase price at 
the time of acquisition are considered to be relevant in quantifying a 
party’s share. As Peter Gibson LJ observed in Curley v Parkes [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1515 at [14]: 
Subsequent payments of the mortgage instalments are not part of the 
purchase price already paid to the vendor, but are sums paid for 
discharging the mortgagor’s obligations under the mortgage … 
This was also the position in Singapore. In an earlier case, Lau Siew 
Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2008] 2 SLR(R) 108 (noted in Kelvin 
Low, “Apparent Gifts: Re-examining the Equitable Presumptions” (2008) 
124 LQR 369), V K Rajah JA thought that only contributions to the 
repayment of a mortgage could be taken into account if there was a 
prior agreement between the parties. Absent such an agreement, 
payment of mortgage instalments would not give rise to a resulting 
trust. 
15.10 This strict approach has come under trenchant criticism by 
Martin Dixon. In the latest edition of his textbook, Modern Land Law 
(Routledge, 2014) at p 176, Dixon writes: 
… [I]t is not immediately apparent why repayment of a mortgage (or 
the financing of its debt if the mortgage is interest-only) that was used 
to purchase the property cannot be regarded as making a contribution 
to its acquisition at the relevant time. It takes only a little imagination 
to regard the mortgagee as the agent of the purchasers, paying at the 
time of purchase, with the mortgagee being repaid as agent with 
interest by the contributors … 
15.11 Rajah JA cited the passage above in Chan Yuen Lan and 
described Dixon’s argument as persuasive. Relying on Lord Neuberger’s 
speech in Stack v Dowden [2007] 2 AC 432 and his judgment in the 
Court of Appeal case of Laskar v Laskar [2008] 1 WLR 2695, Rajah JA 
appeared to have endorsed Lord Neuberger’s analysis of invoking 
equitable accounting in calculating parties’ shares where there are 
contributions to the mortgage instalments. 
15.12 Chan Yuen Lan also considered whether the common intention 
constructive trust provided a more satisfactory doctrinal tool in 
resolving disputes in the domestic context as compared to the resulting 
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trust. The learned judge gave five reasons for preferring Lord 
Neuberger’s dissenting judgment in Stack v Dowden. First, the resulting 
trust provides pragmatic and clear guidance as compared to the 
common intention constructive trust. Rajah JA accepted Dixon’s 
criticism (see Martin Dixon, “Editor’s Casenotes” [2007] Conv 352) that 
Baroness Hale’s analysis is a “litigation generator” and “the property 
lawyers” equivalent of Pandora’s Box”: Chan Yuen Lan at [156]. Second, 
Lord Neuberger’s approach premised on the resulting trust removes a 
distinction between a domestic and commercial context and thus 
ensures a better consistency of results. Third, the resulting trust 
approach “prevents the court from imputing to the parties an intention 
which they never had vis-à-vis the quantification of their respective 
shares of the beneficial interest in the property concerned”: Chan Yuen 
Lan at [156]. According to Rajah JA, the resulting trust approach avoids 
the suspicion of “‘palm tree’ justice being applied in this area in an 
unprincipled and arbitrary manner”: Chan Yuen Lan at [156]. Fourth, 
Lord Neuberger’s approach extends the operation of the common 
intention constructive trust in the commercial context. Again, this 
ensures consistency of application of the doctrine in all circumstances. 
Finally, the primacy of the resulting trust as the default analytical tool in 
the absence of any evidence of a common intention between the parties 
is also consistent with Chambers’ lack of intention analysis. 
15.13 After Chan Yuen Lan, the primary doctrinal analysis to apply in 
Singapore is the resulting trust. First, the presumption is that parties 
hold the beneficial interest in the property in proportion to their 
respective contributions to the purchase price. However, this 
presumption of resulting trust may be rebutted by the presumption of 
advancement which may be applied to certain relationships. Second, the 
presumption of a resulting trust may also be displaced if there is 
sufficient evidence of an express or an inferred common intention that 
the parties should hold their interest in the property in a different 
proportion to their contributions. However, Rajah JA was very firm in 
saying “the court may not impute a common intention to the parties 
where one did not in fact exist”: Chan Yuen Lan at [160]. Third, if there 
is evidence that one party intended to benefit another party with the 
amount which he or she paid, then the presumption of resulting trust 
would not apply. In such cases, the party who paid more would be 
regarded as making a gift to the other person. 
15.14 The case of Quek Hung Heong v Tan Bee Hoon (executrix for 
estate of Quek Cher Choi, deceased) [2014] SGHC 17 concerned a 
dispute over 8A Coronation Road, a two-storey bungalow, in Bukit 
Timah. It was purchased in 1966 and conveyed to five members of the 
Quek family as tenants-in-common in equal shares. The youngest 
member of the Quek family brought a claim in 2011 claiming that the 
property was held by his family members on, inter alia, a resulting trust 
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for him. In a nutshell, the plaintiff ’s case was that there was a family 
arrangement whereby the family members were obliged to recognise his 
beneficial interest upon full repayment of a loan provided by the family 
company. Vinodh Coomaraswamy J was not satisfied as matter of 
evidence that there was such a family arrangement. In any case, the 
learned judge pointed out that there was a conceptual difficulty with the 
plaintiff ’s resulting trust claim because typically a resulting trust arises 
at the point when the property is acquired. In the present case, the 
resulting trust claim was alleged to have arisen after the purchase price 
was paid. Thus, Coomaraswamy J held that the resulting trust claim was 
simply incompatible with the facts of the case. Also, since the court 
rejected the existence of the family arrangement, the claim based on the 
common intention constructive trust similarly failed. 
15.15 Mak Saw Ching v Yam Hui Min, Barbara Rebecca [2014] 
SGHC 212 was a dispute regarding the beneficial interest of a Housing 
and Development Board (“HDB”) flat. In this case, Mak Saw Ching 
(“Mak”), added her granddaughter (“Rebecca”) as a joint tenant of her 
HDB flat. Rebecca is the daughter of Mak’s son, Yam Wing Kong (“Wing 
Kong”), with Maria Yam (“Maria”). Unfortunately, Wing Kong and 
Maria’s marriage broke down three years after the addition of Rebecca as 
a joint tenant. Rebecca sided with her mother in the divorce proceedings 
and moved out of the family home. Mak filed the present proceedings 
and argued that Rebecca held the flat on, inter alia, a resulting trust on 
the basis that Rebecca did not contribute towards the purchase price of 
the flat. It was further contended that there was no presumption of 
advancement between a grandmother and granddaughter and Rebecca 
had to strictly prove the transfer was a gift. In Mak’s further 
submissions, her counsel advanced the case that Mak intended to create 
an express trust where Rebecca was the trustee and Wing Kong was the 
beneficiary. Lee Kim Shin JC rightly held that such an express trust was 
avoided by reason of s 51 of the Housing and Development Act 
(Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed) which prohibited the creation of an express 
trust without the consent of the HDB. The learned judge dismissed the 
claim because he found that Mak’s express trust claim was inconsistent 
with the case that a presumption of a resulting trust arose in her favour. 
Lee JC expressed (at [50]) the following sensible sentiments, that is, 
“where property is transferred gratuitously, it is perhaps difficult to 
imagine that ordinary members of society today would expect the 
transfer to be anything but a gift”. This case illustrates that a resulting 
trust does not arise simply because the donor subsequently regrets 
making a gift to the donee. 
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Constructive trust 
15.16 The facts of Guy Neale (above, para 15.2) have already been 
narrated above. This case is also significant because it considered 
whether an institutional constructive trust should be declared in the 
context of a breach of fiduciary duty: for a recent review on the 
constructive trust jurisprudence, see Yip Man, “Singapore’s Remedial 
Constructive Trust: Lessons from Australia?” (2014) 8 J Eq 77. After 
reviewing the decision of the UK Supreme Court in FHR European 
Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45 which 
considered the issue of a declaration of a constructive trust over bribes 
received by an agent, Sundaresh Menon CJ said what is relevant for the 
present purposes is (at [130]): 
… that a principal is entitled to all the benefits acquired by a fiduciary 
in the course of the fiduciary acting in breach of the duties which he 
owes to his principal. In order to give legal effect to this, specific 
property can be ordered to be delivered up to the principal. 
15.17 In Guy Neale, the Court of Appeal held that one of the partners, 
Chondros, had usurped a corporate opportunity which properly 
belonged to the partnership. The partnership agreement was governed 
by the law of Victoria, Australia, and the test for conflict of interest in 
Victoria is the “real and substantial” possibility of conflict. In the Court 
of Appeal’s view, there was a real and substantial possibility of conflict in 
that the partnership would have wanted to license the use of the 
Singapore trade mark to third parties if the opportunity arose. Since 
Chondros caused the Singapore trade marks to be registered in Nine 
Squares’ name, he acted in breach of his fiduciary duties by usurping a 
corporate opportunity that belonged to the partnership. Eventually, the 
matter was decided on the express trust point. However, the Court of 
Appeal made it clear that, had it been necessary, it was prepared to 
declare an institutional constructive trust over the trade marks as well as 
the profits derived from their exploitation. 
Trust for sale 
15.18 Salbiah bte Adnan v Micro Credit Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 601 
(“Salbiah bte Adnan”) is a brilliant decision which clarifies the issue of 
an interest in land in relation to caveats. Under s 115(3) of the Land 
Titles Act (Cap 157, 2004 Rev Ed), “any person who has an interest in 
the proceeds of sale of land” is regarded as having an interest in land 
which allows him or her to caveat the land. This section has been used 
by moneylenders as a method to caveat property by simply including a 
clause that the lenders of a loan were entitled to be paid from the 
proceeds of the sale of land. Edmund Leow JC perceptively and carefully 
demolished this argument in Salbiah bte Adnan. Leow JC astutely 
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pointed out that the original drafter of the Land Titles Act, John 
Baalman, envisaged this section to apply to a person who was originally 
entitled to land but who is affected by the equitable doctrine of 
conversion. An illustration of this is a beneficiary of a trust for sale. As 
such, the learned judge held that a person who merely had a contractual 
right to be paid from the sale proceeds of the property should not be 
regarded as having an interest to caveat the land. If the moneylender 
intended to take security over the borrower’s property, the moneylender 
should create a mortgage or a charge. Edmund Leow JC’s judgment 
illustrates the importance of a careful interpretation of the Land Titles 
Act with reference to its historical context. 
Charities 
15.19 Koh Lau Keow v Attorney-General [2014] 2 SLR 1165 is destined 
to become the locus classicus on charity law. In this case, there was a 
declaration of a trust over 10 Rangoon Lane. The trust provided for the 
property to be used as, inter alia, a temple. One of the permitted uses of 
the property was “a home or sanctuary for such Chinese women 
vegetarians of the Buddhist faith as may from time to time be chosen by 
the trustees of this deed”. The question which the court had to decide 
on was whether the stated purpose was charitable. In the High Court, 
Tay Yong Kwang J found that the trust was one which advanced religion 
or was capable of being construed as a trust for relief of poverty. On 
appeal, this holding was overturned by the Court of Appeal. In 
construing this trust deed, Chao Hick Tin JA relied on extrinsic 
evidence that the settlor had never allowed poor or destitute Buddhist 
vegetarian women to stay on the property. Instead, the settlor had 
always used part of the property as a private residence for herself and 
her close friends. Chao JA said (at [25]): 
While purely subjective and uncorroborated evidence by a settlor as to 
his intentions at the time the trust deed was drafted is inadmissible 
(Tudor at para 4-004), objective evidence of the settlor’s intent is highly 
relevant in construing a trust deed, especially in cases where its 
language is ambiguous. [emphasis in original] 
The learned judge also thought that this trust did not advance religion 
because there was no sufficient element of public benefit. Chao JA 
applied a line of well-known cases which have held that gifts in favour of 
individuals conducting private religious worship do not satisfy the 
public benefit requirement. 
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Fiduciary relationships 
15.20 Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 329 (noted in 
Wai Yee Wan, “Corporate Claims against Director for Paying Bribes on 
Company’s Behalf ” [2014] LMCLQ 478) dealt with the issue of a 
company director’s liability for authorising bribes paid to third parties 
ostensibly for the purpose of securing business for the company. In the 
present case, the Court of Appeal found that the disputed payments in 
question were meant as gratuities to a third party in order to procure 
certain business for the company. Chao Hick Tin JA held that a director 
who creates a sham contract and makes unauthorised payments out of 
the company’s funds for the purpose of securing business for the 
company cannot be regarded as acting bona fide in the interests of the 
company. Taking a firm stance against bribery, Chao JA observed 
(at [40]): 
Such a director would not be acting honestly even if he claims to be 
furthering the company’s financial interests in the short term. The 
‘interests of the company’ is not just profit maximisation. Neither is it 
profit maximisation by any means. It is as much in the interests of the 
company (comprising its shareholders) to have its directors act within 
their powers and for proper purposes, to obtain full disclosure from its 
directors, and not to be deceived by its directors. Furthermore, there 
can be no doubt that a director who causes a company to make 
payments which are in effect gratuities, thereby running the 
unjustified risk of subjecting the company to criminal liability, is not 
acting in the company’s interests. 
15.21 The High Court’s decision in Dynasty Line Ltd v Sia Sukamto 
[2013] 4 SLR 253 was reviewed last year. On appeal ([2014] 3 SLR 277), 
the Chief Justice confirmed the High Court’s holding on the issue of 
limitation period and a breach of fiduciary duty in the context of 
company directors. Sundaresh Menon CJ held that s 22 of the Limitation 
Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) applied to a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Section 22 of the Limitation Act provides that no period of limitation 
shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust “in respect of any 
fraud or fraudulent breach of trust”. Here, the directors had dealt with 
the company’s property in breach of the trust and confidence that had 
been placed in them as directors. Applying the Court of Appeal’s earlier 
decision in Yong Kheng Leong v Panweld Trading Pte Ltd [2013] 
1 SLR 173 as standing for the proposition that a director who disposes of 
company property in breach of his fiduciary duties is treated as having 
acted in breach of trust and, more specifically, is a Class 1 constructive 
trustee, the learned Chief Justice found that the present action was not 
time barred. Furthermore, the claim was not defeated by laches or 
acquiescence because the claimant had a valid explanation for the delay 
and the defendant was not severely prejudiced by the delay. 
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15.22 Griffin Travel Pte Ltd v Nagender Rao Chilkuri [2014] SGHC 205 
is significant because it contains valuable discussion on when an 
employee is considered to be a fiduciary to his or her employer. After an 
impressive review of both the local and English jurisprudence, Chan 
Seng Onn J said an employee can in appropriate circumstances be 
considered to be a fiduciary. The crucial determining factor is whether 
the employee has placed himself or herself in a position where he must 
act solely in the interests of his employer. On the facts, the learned judge 
held that two of the defendant employees, Adella and Prasad, were not 
fiduciaries to the plaintiff employer. They were not put in a position 
where they could make decisions which could materially affect the 
plaintiff. 
Equitable compensation 
15.23 The case of Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2015] 
1 SLR 496 is worth a brief mention in the context of equitable 
compensation. The High Court’s decision in Then Khek Koon v Arjun 
Permanand Samtani [2014] 1 SLR 245 considered in great detail the 
issue of causation in equitable compensation. The Court of Appeal 
declined to say much about the difficult issue of causation in equitable 
compensation save for noting that this is a very complex area. 
Eventually, this case was decided on another ground. Thus, the issue of 
causation in relation to equitable compensation is by no means settled 
in Singapore: for a critique of the High Court’s decision, see Tan Ruo Yu, 
“Causation in Equitable Compensation” (2014) 26 SAcLJ 724. 
Dishonest assistance and knowing receipt 
15.24 Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 
involved a bitter dispute between an employer and its former employees. 
The plaintiff accused some of its former employees of a myriad of civil 
wrongs including dishonest assistance of a breach of trust. Furthermore, 
the plaintiff sued their former employees’ new employer for knowing 
receipt of confidential information. Both these claims were dismissed. 
With regard to the dishonest assistance claim, it was argued that the 
former employees were trustees of the plaintiff ’s confidential 
information. When the information was disclosed to their new 
employer, it was argued that this meant that the employees had 
dishonestly assisted in a breach of trust. Lee Seiu Kin J rejected this 
convoluted characterisation. Lee J held that it was very difficult to see 
how a trust arose over the plaintiff ’s confidential information. The 
learned judge thought that proper characterisation was simply an action 
against the former employees for a breach of confidence. There was 
simply no need to use the trust framework in this context. Similarly, 
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Lee J rejected the knowing receipt claim. The learned judge held that 
knowing receipt must necessarily involve the receipt of property. In this 
regard, Lee J held that confidential information could not be regarded as 
property in the context of knowing receipt. 
15.25 M+W Singapore Pte Ltd v Leow Tet Sin [2015] 2 SLR 271 was a 
case which dealt with, inter alia, the issue of accessory liability in a 
breach of trust. The plaintiff, M+W Singapore Pte Ltd (“M+W”), was 
appointed by Jurong Data Centre Development Pte Ltd (“JDD”) to 
design and build a data centre. The first and second defendants were the 
directors of JDD and joint signatories of its bank accounts. As JDD was 
defaulting on its payment, JDD and M+W entered into negotiations to 
resolve this difficulty. JDD granted M+W a security by way of a 
debenture where JDD agreed that all “monetary claims” would be 
charged to M+W via a fixed charge to be effected by depositing the 
monetary claims into a claims account. Subsequently, the Inland 
Revenue Authority of Singapore paid JDD over $6m GST refund. This 
money was not paid into the designated claims account. In this case, 
M+W sued the first and second defendants for dishonest assistance of a 
breach of trust. Judith Prakash J crystallised the issues as follows 
(at [42]): 
(a) What did the defendant[s] know of the transaction? 
(b) Does participation in the transaction with this knowledge 
offend ordinary standards? 
On the facts of this case, Prakash J found that the defendants knew 
enough to render their participation in the non-payment of the money 
to a designated bank account to be dishonest. 
 
© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
